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I. INTRODUCTION
Economics: the dismal science. But surely this insults the messenger
who brings the bad news. Economic method is not dismal, unless the mere
sight of mathematics and statistics makes you depressed. Economics tries
to reveal the costs in time, money, and energy of all of life's enterprises; it
refuses to permit dreamers to ignore scarcity. But if resources really are
scarce, are we better off ignoring the truth?
This question is of greater importance for progressives than conserva-
tives. While conservatives can oppose government regulatory and spending
programs "on principle," a credible progressive movement must weigh the
costs as well as the benefits of reform. It is, then, odd and unfortunate that
law and economics is often associated with a set of conservative" and, to
many, morally dismal ideologies that have no intrinsic connection to the
economic analysis of legal problems. This Comment urges the develop-
ment of a reformist law and economics,2 closely linked to administrative
t Ely Professor of Law and Political Economy, Yale University.
1. For an example of polemical writing that encourages the popular association of law and eco-
nomics with the political right, see McConnell, The Counter-Revolution in Legal Thought, 48 PoL'Y
REV. 18, 23-24 (1987). Although McConnell admits that law and economics "has no overt ideological
element," he nevertheless claims that "law and economics scholars will-with only rare excep-
tions-take positions comparable with libertarian conservatives." Id. at 23-24.
2. This proposal is not without precedent. Many of the earliest law and economics scholars were
liberal reformers. See L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986). In the Federal
Republic of Germany, law and economics has a reformist emphasis. See H. SCHAFFER & C. OTr,
OKONOMIscHEN ANALYSE DES ZsVILRECHTS (1988) [forthcoming].
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law and based on public finance theory, public policy analysis, and social
choice theory.
With the fiftieth anniversary of the Administrative Procedure Act' on
the horizon, this is a propitious time for reconsidering the law of the ad-
ministrative state. On the one hand, the postwar period has seen an explo-
sion of new learning on both the economic analysis of policy issues and
the political-economic evaluation of government processes. On the other
hand, changes in the law have forced both judges and legal scholars to
reexamine the roles of Congress, agencies, and courts. Laws regulating
environmental pollution, safety, and health cut across a broad range of
industries and involve complex scientific and social questions which raise
new issues of public accountability and competence in all branches of gov-
ernment. Together, these joint developments in the world of ideas and the
realm of practical politics and policy suggest the promise of a law and
economics scholarship based on the insights of political economy.
This new direction is at odds with three dominant strands of law and
economics. The first, associated with the University of Chicago, takes
wealth maximization as a first principle, viewing it as a happy compro-
mise between utilitarianism and, free choice.4 A second emphasizes the key
role of stable, well-defined property rights in promoting efficiency and
economic growth.5 A third, the Virginia School, employs public choice
theory in a constitutional framework to demonstrate the failings of gov-
ernment." Scholars in all three traditions are skeptical about the legiti-
macy of legislative and bureaucratic processes and share a confidence in
the value of market outcomes.
Critiques of these three schools are a familiar feature of the academic
scene.' I have contributed elsewhere9 and will not repeat my arguments
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). See The Administrative Procedure Act: A Fortieth Anniversary
Symposium, 72 VA. L. REv. 215 (1986).
4. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-82 (1981). But wealth maximization apparently is not the only principle
worth considering. See Posner, The Effects of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. KAN. L.
REv. 261, 264 (1988).
5. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATION-
SHIPS: READINGS IN THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 23 (1975); Furubotn & Pejovich, Property
Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, in id. at 53; Pejovich, Specification of
Property Rights, in id. at 32; Stubblebine, On Property Rights and Institutions, in id. at 11; see also
Staaf, Property Rights and Choice, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 175 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989) [forthcom-
ing] [hereinafter LAW AND ECONOMICS].
6. See J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975);
J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLUCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON
TRIAL (1980); Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS,
supra note 5, at 123; see also, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988)
(collection emphasizing Virginia approach).
7. A fourth school has had little impact on legal thought. This is the view espoused by Gary
Becker that all law is optimal. Given transaction costs, all political and economic deals that are worth
making are, in fact, made. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983).
8. For critiques by noneconomists, see B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 80-93
(1983); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theoy, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S.
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here. Instead, Section II of this Comment takes up the constructive task of
outlining a reformist political economy of law that operates within the
basic paradigms of economic theory and builds on the work of
noneconomists currently active in the public law field." My object is to
promote the reform of public law, not the sanctification of the common
law tradition. After linking political economy to work in administrative
law, Section III proposes a statute that envisions a new role for the courts
in reviewing legislation. Section IV evaluates occupational health and
safety policy from the perspective of the Congress, the agencies, and the
courts. The conclusion suggests how research on administrative law can
productively combine the detailed study of particular policy issues with a
broader political-economic perspective.
II. THE REFORMIST SCHOOL
A reformist law and economics denies the primacy of the existing distri-
bution of property rights while retaining the assumption of methodological
individualism that is central to the economic approach. From this base,
reformist analysis looks in two directions: toward public policy analyses
designed to improve the efficiency of the economy, and toward work in
public choice that seeks procedures to resolve distributive issues fairly.
Students of each approach rarely take each other seriously. This intellec-
tual isolation should be overcome to produce a unified scholarship draw-
ing on both traditions. This section begins, however, by sketching the ba-
sic features of each perspective.
A. The Public Policy Framework
Public policy analysis is based on welfare economics, which emphasizes
externalities and market failures, and the theory of imperfect competition,
which focuses on the inefficiency of monopoly power, imperfect informa-
CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979); Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Kennedy &
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974); Shapiro, Richard
Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 999 (1987). For critiques by economists, see Kornhauser, A Guide
to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591 (1980); Polinsky, Eco-
nomic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655 (1974).
9. Rose-Ackerman, Tullock and the Inefficiency of the Common Law, in DEMOCRACY AND PUB-
LIC CHOICE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GORDON TULLOCK 181 (C. Rowley ed. 1987); Rose-Ackerman,
Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. (1989)
[forthcoming]; Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 233; Rose-Ackerman, Recht und Ohonomie, in H. SCHAFFER & C.
OTT, supra note 2; Rose-Ackerman, Book Review, 8 J. POL'Y & MGMT. 726 (1988) (reviewing W.
LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)).
10. See infra notes 29-30. My approach is also complementary to the work of such neo-
institutionalists as Oliver Williamson. See 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM (1985).
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tion, and monopolistic competition. The level of analysis is the market or,
in cost-benefit analyses, the public program. The underlying philosophy is
utilitarianism or wealth maximization with an egalitarian side
constraint."
Work on public policy is basically optimistic about politics, viewing
government as a system which designs and implements policies to improve
the efficiency and equity of society. Economists and lawyers working in
the field see themselves as central to policy development, producing cost-
benefit analyses and other useful analytic exercises. They are similar to
Chicagoans in recognizing the value of markets in promoting efficiency
and the importance of economic incentives in both the private and public
sectors. They are trying to get the economic incentives right, not eliminate
them.
A fundamental methodological difference, however, separates the two
approaches. Chicagoans concentrate on common law courts, which typi-
cally rule on individual transactions. 2 Of course, the decision in one case
may affect behavior in future similar situations, but the emphasis is on
affecting individual behavior, not reforming market structures.13 In con-
trast, students of public policy look to the legislature and the executive
branch as the institutions in which basic policy changes originate. This
perspective invites a more comprehensive view of the overall effect of pol-
icy on markets.
However, public policy analysis generally lacks a realistic view of the
workings of the political process. With very few exceptions, 1' the work
represents the best advice an economist can give to a policymaker, ignor-
ing political feasibility or, rather, leaving the politician or top bureaucrat
with the task of linking the economic prescriptions with political reality.
B. Public Choice
Public choice theory attempts to provide realistic positive models of
politics and to find methods of making collective choices that have desira-
ble normative characteristics. The positive analysis tries to explain how
political and bureaucratic bodies actually behave by assuming that the po-
litical actors are self-interested maximizers of something (e.g., votes,
11. Standard works include R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (4th ed. 1984); A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); E.
STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978); and D. WEIMER & A. VIN-
ING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (1988).
12. For an overview of law and economics from this perspective, see Kornhauser, Legal Rules as
Incentives, in LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 28. See also Rose-Ackerman, Law and Eco-
nomics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, supra note 9, at 233.
13. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 4, at 249-428.
14. See, e.g., Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradeable Emission Permits, in REFORM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 39 (W. Magat ed. 1982); Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline De-
regulation and the Public Interest, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 179.
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agency budgets, profits, utility). It then evaluates the agency-principal
problems and strategic behavior concerns central to representative demo-
cratic government and to the performance of bureaucracies. The norma-
tive analysis specifies desirable conditions for collective choice procedures
and seeks decision processes that satisfy these conditions. The two ap-
proaches overlap since many abstract normative problems associated with
collective choice also arise in any decisionmaking body that makes choices
by aggregating individual preferences.
Modern normative work began with Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem.'" Arrow specified a set of obviously attractive and seemingly
minimal normative conditions and then proved that no social choice pro-
cess could satisfy all of them.16 The theorem can be seen as formal proof
that economics cannot be a universal science of political-economic life. Ar-
row also provoked a line of research that produced constructive results of
more limited scope. Scholars began a fuller analysis of the normative
properties of various voting rules' 7 and demonstrated the pervasiveness of
incentives for strategic action.' 8
Positive, institutionally-oriented work has modelled the behavior of rep-
resentative assemblies and bureaucracies and analyzed individual political
behavior. 9 Recent research stresses the importance of legislative proce-
dural rules, such as committee structure and amending procedures, in af-
fecting the ultimate legislative outcome.20 If, for example, a majority-rule
15. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951 & 2d ed. 1963).
16. Arrow was seeking a social ordering that, like individual preferences, is transitive, complete,
and reflexive. The social ordering must not place any other restrictions on individual preferences. The
resulting rule must be efficient in the sense that if everyone finds option A at least as good as option B
and at least one person prefers A, then A should be the social choice. No one can be a dictator whose
preferences always determine the social outcome, and a condition called independence of irrelevant
alternatives must hold. This condition states that the social choice between A and B depends only
upon how A and B are ranked by individuals. The ranking of other options is irrelevant. In a world
with more than two mutually exclusive options, no social ordering can be found which satisfies these
conditions. Id. at 46-60.
17. Some of the seminal work was written at about the same time as Arrow's proof. The classic
article on the normative properties of majority rule is May, A Set of Independent, Necessary, and
Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952). On the charac-
teristics of preferences needed for consistent majority choice, see D. BLACK, A THEORY OF COMMIT-
TEES AND ELECTIONS (1963). For reviews of work in this field, see J. BONNER, INTRODUCTION TO
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1986); A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 196-215 (1980); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY
AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986); and A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
18. See Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587
(1973); Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Condition: Existence and Correspondence
Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. EcoN. THEORY 187 (1975);
see also A. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 196-215 (nontechnical overview).
19. See, e.g., J. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS (1974); M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE
OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CON-
NECTION (1974); Shepsle, The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social
Choice and Spatial Models, 50 PUB. CHOICE 135 (1978). The foundations of this research were laid
by economists. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
20. See, e.g., P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 17; Gilligan & Krehbiel, Collective Decisionmaking and
Standing Committees, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 287 (1987); Krehbiel, Sophisticated Committees and
1988]
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legislature binds itself to take final votes that compare proposed changes
with preexisting legal rules, this procedure limits the laws that can be
adopted. Without such a constraint, the outcome might be almost any-
where in the space of possible alternatives. After a series of votes on
amended bills, the majority might not prefer the final statute to the status
quo which existed before the legislature began work."1
Researchers have also modelled how a government bureaucracy affects
legislative choices both at the drafting stage and at the budgetary appro-
priations stage. Some argue that legislators design laws so that they con-
tain numerous opportunities for "casework." After such laws are on the
books, a legislator can benefit her constituents by intervening in their
favor with the bureaucracy.22 Other work suggests that the extent of con-
gressional delegation to the executive branch depends upon whether bene-
fits and costs are concentrated or diffused. If benefits are diffused and
costs are concentrated, Congress is likely to prefer shifting the difficult
choices to an agency." Finally, research on the budgetary process shows
how an agency's control over program information and over the allocation
of funds can be used to increase or maintain budgetary appropriations. 4
Most of this positive work is skeptical about the normative claims for
democratic government. Self-interested, vote-maximizing behavior does
not seem broadly compatible with the production of efficient public poli-
cies." Skepticism, however, need not lead to conservatism or the espousal
of minimal government." After all, private institutions, be they corpora-
tions, families, or voluntary organizations, also disappoint idealists. In
practice, much normative work in public choice is almost radical, arguing
that the distribution of property and privilege produced by the market and
other nongovernmental institutions should not be given weight by the po-
litical system. One reason majority rule appeals to normative theorists is
Structure-Induced Equilibria, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 346-75 (M. McCubbins &
T. Sullivan eds. 1976); Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561
(1977); Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,
in CONGRESS: STRUCTrURE AND POLIC:Y, supra, at 376-402.
21. Shepsle & Weingast, When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?, 46 J. PoL 207 (1984).
22. Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators, and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public
Sector, 1978 AM. ECON. REV.- PROC. & PAPERS 256.
23. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in REGULATORY
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (R. Noll ed. 1985).
24. R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1979); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
25. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, Inefficiency and Reelection, 33 KYKLOS 287 (1980); Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971). Work in this skeptical tradition is sum-
marized in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987). In a
second article, however, these authors reference recent work suggesting that consistency (if not effi-
ciency) is possible in a range of plausible situations. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 432-33 (1988); see also P. ORDESHOOK, supra note 17, at 144, 202.
26. See, e.g., A. SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (1972); Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
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that even the status quo must obtain majority support in order to
survive. 1
C. The Reform of Administrative Law
Reformist law and economics combines public policy and public choice
to redirect the study of administrative law. Unfortunately, most econo-
mists in law schools have not made this connection. They concentrate on
the common law fields of tort, contract, and property, or, drawing on a
tradition of economically-informed legal scholarship, focus on antitrust,
public utilities, and trade regulation.28 In the absence of interest from
economists on law faculties, a number of noneconomists in administrative
law have begun to creatively use both public policy" and public choice.3 0
Even so, American administrative law remains a court-centered field fo-
cusing on judicial review of agency behavior.31 So long as courts remain at
the center, the majority of legal commentators can ignore issues related to
economic efficiency and political choice. Thus, an awkward fit exists be-
tween public policy analysis and the traditional concerns of administrative
law. While economists are not well-informed about institutional, bureau-
cratic realities and are especially ignorant of the courts, most lawyers are
accustomed to focusing on procedural issues and the role of lawsuits in
producing change, but do not fully understand the underlying economic
and political issues.
Despite the narrow concerns of conventional work in administrative
law, public choice scholars can provide analyses of bureaucratic and legis-
lative institutions that are directly relevant to judges concerned with pro-
27. This condition, called the "neutrality condition," requires that no option, including the status
quo, has any special priority under the social decision rule chosen. See May, supra note 17.
28. This work is sometimes called the "old" law and economics to contrast it with the new law
and economics of the common law. See Rowley, supra note 6; Veljanovski, The Role of Economics in
the Common Law, 7 REs. L. & EcoN. 41 (1985).
29. For representative samples of this work, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/
DIRTY AIR (1981); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); Bruff, Legislative Formality,
Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207 (1984); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Admin-
istrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social Cost
Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1423 (1981); Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Disci-
pline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 120 (1977); Stewart, The Reforma-
tion of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); and Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986).
30. Public choice material is used in Cass, Looking with One Eye Closed: The Twilight of Admin-
istrative Law, 66 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986); Debow & Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding)
Public Choice: A Response to Farber & Frickey, 66 TEx. L. REV. 993 (1988); Farber & Frickey,
Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1013
(1988); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, supra note 25; Farber & Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 25; Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its
Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 560 (1977); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Legislation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); and Spitzer, Radio
Formats by Administrative Choice, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 647 (1980).
31. See, for example, even those casebooks that draw most heavily on the social science literature
in infra note 35.
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cedural fairness. In practice, however, these links have seldom been made.
There are two explanations for this. First, judges have been reluctant to
evaluate the structure of the legislative process32 and too often have as-
sumed that bureaucracies should act like courts.
Second, a few Chicago School efforts have thus far dominated the rele-
vant legal scholarship, using public choice to buttress their court-centered
approach. In this interpretation, public choice merely emphasizes the im-
possibility of consistent political choice and the pervasiveness of strategic
manipulation in representative assemblies and bureaucracies.3 3 Given this
bleak assessment of political life, the emphasis on courts is given added
support. However, affirmative efforts by legal scholars and jurists to de-
termine the proper division of authority between the public and the pri-
vate sector should not be undermined by emphasizing the failures of legis-
latures and bureaucracies to live up to impossible ideals, particularly
given the failure of markets and courts to live up to equally unrealistic
expectations.3 '
If policy analysis and public choice are to be constructive forces, those
who import economic analysis into public law must be prepared to reori-
ent the fields in which they study and teach. Administrative law should
become more concerned with the way substantive policy is made and with
reviewing the paradoxes and inconsistencies of collective choice processes.
While this shift in emphasis has already begun, 5 it should go much fur-
ther. The focus should be less on whether all the affected interests have
been heard or on whether the state is harming particular individuals, and
more on the structural characteristics of the political and policy process
and on the evaluation of substantive outcomes in terms of equity and
efficiency.
What is needed is a broad-based, collaborative effort, by economists,
lawyers and political scientists to reform administrative law. In the post-
32. See, e.g., Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937) (legislature presumed to know
needs of people); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197 (1933) ("In theory, at least, the legisla-
ture acts upon adequate knowledge after full consideration and through members who represent the
entire public.").
33. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the Economic Sys-
tem, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983);
Macey, supra note 30, at 223; Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CI. L. REv. 262 (1982).
34. Of course, even Richard Posner recognizes that markets may fail to allocate resources effi-
ciently. However, the chapter in his text devoted to comparing regulation with the common law con-
siders examples that favor the common law. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note
4, at 343-64.
35. The casebooks of S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY (2d ed. 1985); R. CASS & C. DIvER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1987); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
(2d ed. 1985); and G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (3d
ed. 1986) do make some attempt to incorporate a social science perspective. See also W. ESKRIDGE, &
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1988) (casebook in related field that incorporates material from political science and public
choice).
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war period, not only has the federal government moved to regulate new
areas such as worker health and safety and the environment, but social
science research on substantive policy and government social choice proce-
dures has burgeoned. The courts have made a number of awkward at-
tempts to incorporate this new learning into their opinions but have not
systematically explored its implications for judicial review of congressional
and agency actions. The remainder of this Comment shows how this
might be accomplished. Thus, Section III builds on existing legal scholar-
ship to outline a new approach to judicial review of statutes and the legis-
lative process that could improve the accountability of Congress to the
public.
III. CRITIQUING THE LEGISLATURE: TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK
STATUTE
A. Public Choice Analysis of Legislation
Any proposal to improve the accountability of the legislative process
must take a realistic view of Congress. 6 Work on public choice suggests
that realism consists in recognizing that reelection is a central goal of
members of Congress and that citizens have poor information about the
actions of legislators. Therefore, without constraints, legislators have few
incentives to reveal deals that would not be obvious to superficial observ-
ers. Representatives want to claim credit for politically beneficial ac-
tions-emphasizing the positive aspects of the laws passed and downplay-
ing the negative.17 Both electoral challengers and fellow members of
Congress may point to flaws in a law, but if the statute appears to be
responding to a popular concern (drug abuse, environmental pollution,
consumer protection), no one may stand to gain from a curmudgeonly cri-
tique of the statutory language or a gloomy prediction about future appro-
priations. 8 Thus, the competitive aspects of politics, while an important
check, are unlikely to provide sufficient information to voters on the impli-
cations of new statutes.
Realism also forces one to recognize that interest group bargains cannot
be prevented in a representative democracy. They are the cost of voting
rules that are not too heavily biased toward the status quo. 9 So long as
the distribution of wealth produced by private markets is not accorded
36. For an attempt to supply judges with such a view, see Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know
about Lawmaking in Congress, in JuDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90
(R. Katzmann ed. 1988).
37. D. MAYHEW, supra note 19, at 52-61 (arguing that credit-claiming is one important activity
of legislators who wish to be reelected).
38. See M. FIORINA, supra note 19, at 39-49; Davidson, supra note 36, at 114 (arguing that
statutes "may be internally vague, confusing, and inconsistent").
39. Majority rule, for example, gives no priority to the status quo. See supra note 27.
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some special normative status,4 one must accept the fact that political
choices will help some and harm others, and people will seek to be on the
winning side.
Recent legal writing on the role of the Supreme Court in reviewing
legislation has articulated two sharply contrasting models of legislative be-
havior. The first, drawing on the public choice literature and associated
with Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner, views most statutes as bar-
gains between conflicting groups."1 Courts should uphold the bargain sup-
ported by the legislative majority but should not go beyond the explicit
language of the statute. Narrow readings are favored.
In viewing most laws as "contracts," however, these authors ignore
some important lessons of public choice theory. In a legislative deal, a
high proportion of affected parties need not agree to the terms. Only ma-
jority support in the legislature is needed, and even supporters may re-
present many people who are opposed to the new law. While third parties
may also be affected by private contracts, legislation can redistribute re-
sources in ways that private contracts cannot. There is a special need for
public institutions to assure that all affected individuals at least have ac-
cess to information on legislative behavior. The contractual view of statu-
tory law held by Posner and Easterbrook fails to emphasize the impor-
tance of publicity and responsibility to the electorate in determining the
proper function of judicial review. Theirs is not a true public choice anal-
ysis at all, but rather draws too glibly on private contract doctrine to in-
terpret public actions.
At the other extreme from Posner and Easterbrook are those commen-
tators who argue that the courts should hold the legislature to substantive
standards of the public good. Courts, according to this view, should be-
come expositors of values within government and should insist that Con-
gress follow their lead. The substantive goal might be a wealth maximiza-
tion standard, a utilitarian ideal, or an egalitarian principle, but whatever
it is, courts should judge laws by it. 2 Although the role of courts has
seldom been considered by economists, most believe that legislation should
40. Cf. J. MEADE, EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY AND THE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY (1965) (arguing
for redistributive policies); K. WICKSELL, VALUE, CAPITAL AND RENT 43 (1954 & reprint 1970)
("[N]o one, however learned or sagacious he may be, can claim for the majority of the present posses-
sors of capital and rent a right higher than that which lies in the instinct of self-preservation . .
41. See supra note 33.
42. Bennett, Mere Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979) (unalloyed personal favor is illegitimate purpose); Mashaw, Constitu-
tional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849 (1980) (constitu-
tional argument for requirement that laws serve public interest); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) (courts should require laws to have public-regarding
purposes); Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1487
(1979) (laws with economic content should further ends of allocation, stabilization or distribution).
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further the substantive goal of efficiency. Some scholars have sought to
design political institutions that produce this result.4
The ideal legislative process, in my view, falls between these extremes.
My position can be articulated in a weak form that is closer to the legisla-
tion-as-bargain view or in a strong form that is closer to the public inter-
est view. The weak form acknowledges the fact that much legislation is a
bargain among self-interested actors; therefore, judicial review should im-
prove the information available to those affected by the bargain. Within
constitutional limits,44 the courts must accept the fact that laws passed by
a majority of the legislature may harm both poorly organized groups and
well-organized but politically weak groups. The courts should not try to
prevent this kind of lawmaking. The aim of judicial review should, in-
stead, be to make legislators more responsible to the electorate by assuring
that information about legislative bargains is more widely available. Indi-
viduals can then decide whether to take political action and, if so, what
kind."
The strong form of my position views the ideal legislative process as
one in which representatives deliberate about the public interest.4" Here,
the legislature is viewed as a forum for discussing different points of view
and for formulating policy that reconciles political differences. Those who
engage in these debates, whether they are legislators or others trying to
influence political outcomes, should use broad public interest arguments to
justify their positions. Public policy analysis should play a role in helping
to justify or critique proposed statutory changes. Instead of simply assert-
ing that a bill is good for the trucking industry, supporters, if they can do
so responsibly, should explain why large segments of the public will bene-
fit as well. Despite denials by conservative public choice scholars, evidence
suggests that at least some lawmaking is deliberative and that ideas and
principles do play a role in the legislative process.
In either its weak or strong form, a case can be made for a new kind of
judicial review, one that imposes particular forms of statutory consistency
on all legislative output. This Comment outlines a new framework statute,
analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act, aimed at defining the sort
of judicial intervention that might encourage deliberation and improve
voters' capacity to monitor the output of congressional bargains.48
43. See, e.g., Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17 (1971); Tideman &
Tullock, A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1976).
44. For a discussion of these limits, see Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv.
713 (1985).
45. But Cf. M. OlsoN, supra note 19 (discussing difficulties of organizing for collective action).
46. See Mashaw, supra note 42; Sunstein, supra note 42.
47. See J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); Kalt & Zupan,
Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am. EcoN. REv. 301 (1984); Levine,
supra note 14, at 179.
48. Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AIN'D ImuST 74 (1980) (arguing for related approach using con-
stitutionally-founded review based on process by which statutes are passed).
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B. Legislative Consistency
The proposed framework statute to govern judicial review of legislative
consistency does not demand the logically impossible. The results of public
choice research show that global consistency across issues is extremely un-
likely in a majority rule system, or indeed under any voting rule, so long
as people's preferences are free to take on any values." Voting cycles are
endemic. 50 Thus it would be inconsistent with democratic values for courts
to require logical consistency in a global sense. Such a strong position
would truly be counter-majoritarian. Under my proposal, in contrast,
courts would look only at the properties of individual statutes. First,
judges would consider whether the statute's means plausibly further its
stated ends. Second, they would ask if appropriations permit the plausible
pursuit of statutory purposes.
The first type of consistency-call it "internal consistency"-would be
enforced by judicial insistence that statutes contain statements of purpose
that could be taken seriously by the courts as reflecting legislative intent.
These statements could express multiple purposes, but to the extent that
purposes conflict, the introductory material should give some guidance
concerning the way tradeoffs are to be made. Anything in the body of the
statute that is inconsistent with the prefatory statement of purpose would
be invalidated by the court. Legislators would be forced to articulate aims
and to stick to them in drafting specific provisions. The courts would not
engage in policy analysis when they review statutes, but they would insist
that the legislators both articulate a set of purposes and consider the rela-
tionship between means and ends.
The demand for internal consistency addresses two problems. On the
one hand, some statutes have overly ambitious preambles that cannot pos-
sibly be accomplished given the other goals people care about (e.g., reduc-
ing water pollution to zero, eliminating cancer risks).5 Internal consis-
tency is designed to interject a note of realism into the preambles of such
statutes and, as a consequence, to encourage a more informed debate over
policy tradeoffs. On the other hand, some statutes have narrowly focused
preambles (protecting the health of those who use barbers or need eye
49. See K. ARROW, supra note 15, at 46-60. The conditions Arrow places on the social ordering
are stated informally at note 16 supra.
50. Some observers complain that they have never seen a voting cycle. This observation is consis-
tent with a political system that has structured its procedures so that no political decisionmaking
process can go on forever. For example, legislators commonly refuse to permit the reintroduction of an
option that lost in an earlier test. Several scholars have isolated cases in which they believe a voting
cycle is present in the underlying preferences. See, e.g., W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 35,
at 370-73; Riker, Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting, in I MATHEMAT-
ICAL APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (J. Claunch ed. 1965).
51. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 have as their
goal "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985," 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (1982), and the Delaney Clause in the Food Additive Amendments of 1958, 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(s) (1982), prohibits additives that cause cancer in humans or laboratory animals.
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care), but include provisions with no obvious link to these purposes
(grandfather clauses, advertising bans, prohibitions on corporate owner-
ship). 2 When faced with special interest statutes, courts would only allow
legislative judgments to stand if the preambles clearly stated the acts' pur-
poses (for example, protecting existing barbers or favoring optometrists). 3
My framework proposal would also require a second kind of consis-
tency-budgetary consistency-whose importance is increasingly obvious
in a modern welfare state. Here the problem may not be evident from the
statutory language. The act promises broad benefits in its statement of
purpose, and it is only several years later, when appropriations are not
sufficient to meet stated goals, that the inconsistency between budgetary
means and statutory aims becomes clear. Legislators have an incentive to
pass this sort of law because they can claim credit at the time of passage
and may never be blamed for the low level of appropriations. If, however,
this behavior results in judicial invalidation, the public stigma may make
such behavior less politically appealing in the first place.
One justification for budgetary consistency derives from the value of an
informed bargain. Both beneficiaries and taxpayers should know what has
been agreed on by the legislature. Budgetary consistency would then force
the legislators to clarify what they are committed to doing. Moreover, this
consistency requirement could foster a deliberative process that places
more weight on the formulation of public values. By forcing representa-
tives to confront the financial consequences of their rhetoric, a more
sharply focused debate will result, and Congress will be able to deliberate
more meaningfully on the relationship between activist goals and fiscal
means.
A budgetary consistency requirement could be beneficial without asking
courts to invalidate defective laws outright. Such drastic measures would
be appropriate only if after a further period of deliberation, Congress
neither rewrote the statute, nor appropriated more money, nor explained
52. Many state regulatory statutes fall into this category. For example, a Virginia statute regulat-
ing pharmacists was supposed to protect the public interest. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.2 (1950). The
act contained a ban on price advertising. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1950). The advertising ban
was struck down by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also the statutes at issue in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
53. My proposal resembles the type of review proposed by Macey, supra note 30 (arguing for
conventional approach to statutory interpretation that looks to "plain meaning" in both statutes and
legislative history and does not try to reconstruct back room bargains). Macey, however, does not go
far enough. We need a stronger judicial posture that not only refuses to enforce hidden-implicit deals
but also tests statutes themselves for internal consistency. Inconsistency is not recognized by Macey as
a problem that requires judicial notice. He also ignores the possibility that courts may give a public
interest gloss to special interest legislation that has been packaged in attractive rhetoric. Both possibili-
ties require more than a "plain meaning" approach-the former, because there is no plain meaning;
the latter, because the "plain" meaning is misleading.
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how legislative ends and financial means were more harmonious than the
court's analysis suggested.
In short, while requiring internal consistency between stated purposes
and statutory language may seem quite different from mandating consis-
tency between statutory language and subsequent budgetary appropria-
tions, both proposals actually have similar aims. Each consistency test at-
tempts to increase the accountability of the legislature to the voting public
and to improve deliberation within Congress. Each does this by requiring
Congress to recognize the constraints imposed by conflicting goals and
limited resources and by insisting that special interest deals, when they
occur, be publicly recognized as one of a statute's purposes. The aim is to
reconcile pluralist democracy and the separation of powers with an in-
formed deliberation about means and ends.
Although my proposed statute calls for an activist federal judiciary, ca-
pable of understanding and evaluating policy arguments, it does not envi-
sion judges who seek to convert their own policy preferences into law.
Instead, the statute aims to reinforce democratic representation by adding
greater realism to judicial interpretation of statutes and review of the leg-
islative process. Its approach thus is complementary to the process-
oriented perspective on judicial review espoused by John Ely who studies
political speech, voting rights and unconstitutional classifications but does
not address the possibility that legislators might mislead voters."
IV. CRITIQUING THE LAW: THE EXAMPLE OF WORKPLACE HEALTH
AND SAFETY REGULATION
A reformist law and economics can illuminate not only broad-based is-
sues of government structure and performance, but also more narrowly
focused policy issues of concern to administrative lawyers, legislators, and
judges. Workplace health and safety regulation provides a clear-cut exam-
ple of the relevance of law and economics to the work of all branches of
government. Section IV(A) begins with a general analysis of the issue
from a public policy perspective, a perspective that should guide responsi-
ble congressional deliberations. Next, I criticize the distributive arguments
that have been central to the political debate over health and safety regu-
lation. While redistribution is a valid statutory goal and while aid to
working people is a legitimate concern of a democratic government, I ar-
gue that a well-informed policy analysis suggests that occupational health
and safety regulation is a poor method of achieving these aims. Section
IV(A) concludes with an outline of a policy that emphasizes the correction
of market failures. With this proposal as background, Section IV(B) criti-
cizes current legislation that regulates workplace health and safety and
54. J. ELY, supra note 48. In the course of his more detailed analyses of other issues, Ely notes
that requiring clear statements of purpose would be a costly reform. Id. at 129.
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assesses its implementation by the bureaucracy and its fate in the courts. I
conclude with Justice Rehnquist's attempt to revive the nondelegation
doctrine in response to congressional efforts to escape accountability for
the substance of regulatory policy. Rather than obstruct the ability of
Congress to delegate complex and technical matters to agencies, I argue
that the statute proposed above provides a more effective framework for
evaluating legislation.
A. A Policy Analytic Framework
1. Efficient Risk Regulation
The analysis of occupational health and safety begins with three famil-
iar points.5 First, most people voluntarily take many risks in their daily
lives because of the accompanying benefits. No one lives as if his or her
main goal were maximizing the number of breaths taken." Second, peo-
ple tend to be poorly informed about actual levels of risk. Many studies
have documented these misperceptions and the general tendency to overes-
timate the probability of events that are beyond one's control while under-
estimating other risky possibilities. 7 Third, it is often difficult to present
risk assessments in ways that can be easily used by ordinary people in
their daily lives.
These observations about individual behavior form a familiar starting
point for an analysis of health and safety risks in the workplace. The
simple economic story told by Chicagoans posits a labor market with
many competing employers. If workers are informed about risks, they will
demand higher wages for high risk jobs. They will also sort themselves
over the available jobs depending upon their preferences toward risk.5"
Even in this simple competitive world, one complication must be intro-
duced immediately. Knowing that they must compensate workers to take
risks, employers would like to keep job hazards secret. Therefore, the
market will then only work efficiently if potential new employees can ob-
serve the riskiness of jobs. One way such information might be provided is
through a learning process. The first round of employees are uninformed,
55. For more comprehensive discussions of the issues outlined below, see J. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULA-
TION AT OSHA (1988) [hereinafter J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA]; J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING
SAFETY (1979); W. Viscusl, RISK BY CHOICE (1983).
56. W. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 1-5.
57. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P.
Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs, How Safe is Safe
Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL'Y Sc.
127 (1978) (demonstrating complexity of individual risk judgments).
58. W. ViscusI, supra note 55, at 37-58. The evidence for this theory is not clear-cut. See Smith,
Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339
(1979) (only risk of death is incorporated into wage differentials); Viscusi, Labor Market Valuations
of Life and Limb: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 26 PUB. POL'Y 359 (1978) (workers
do obtain wage premiums in risky jobs).
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but after they are injured, other members of the labor force observe their
injuries and illnesses and demand that the company pay a wage premium
or reduce workplace hazards.
There are many reasons why this learning process will work poorly in
the real world. First, many hazards take a long time to produce injuries.
Second, even if they happen quickly, participants in a large labor market
will not observe many of the injured. Third, the level of hazard depends
on workers as well as workplaces. Some workers are more susceptible to
hazards because of their genetic characteristics or their life style-for ex-
ample, whether they smoke. Therefore, it may be difficult for job appli-
cants correctly to infer their own risk by observing the harm suffered by
others. Fourth, workplace conditions change with technology-so the past
may be a poor guide to the future. For all these reasons, regulations that
require employers to inform employees of hazards are easy to justify. The
information must, however, be provided in a form that employees can un-
derstand and use to compare job market options. 9
But the mere provision of information may not be sufficient for two
different reasons. The first turns on the limited information-processing
capacities of people, especially regarding probabilistic information. Rather
than engage in a massive educational campaign, it may be more efficient
to regulate workplace health and safety directly through administrative
orders or incentive schemes. This justification will be especially strong
when the employer's action affects all employees, the plant employs a
large number of people, and most people, if informed, would assert that
the benefits of added safety outweigh the costs.
A second reason why an information strategy may be inadequate con-
cerns the production function for health and safety. Many actions employ-
ers take are "local public goods." If dust collectors are installed, they will
benefit all employees on a shop floor, and if a harmless chemical is substi-
tuted for a toxic, everyone who comes in contact with the material will
benefit. However, if the employees are not organized into a union, indi-
vidual workers may be unwilling to modify their wage demands enough to
make the health and safety investment worthwhile. If employers do not
know the value workers place on safety, they may be unwilling to experi-
ment with costly changes that may not pay off in lower wage increases or
improved productivity. Established employers are especially unlikely to
act if money wages are sticky downward and thus cannot be reduced in
the face of an acknowledged improvement in working conditions.
There is a final argument for regulating workplace health and safety.
Given the widespread existence of health insurance, welfare, and publicly
59. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 13-15; W. Viscusi, supra note 55,
at 59-87; Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and
Use Data, 87 Mimi. L. REv. (1989) (forthcoming).
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subsidized health care for the poor and old, individuals do not bear all of
the costs of their illnesses and injuries. Furthermore, individuals may not
properly weigh the pain and suffering of their relatives and friends. Given
a public commitment to redistributive policies, especially in health care,
individuals may fail to take into account all the social costs of their risky
employment decisions. Their insulation provides a final public policy jus-
tification for public regulation of these risks.60
2. Inalienability and Distributive Benefits
The efficiency arguments for risk regulation are powerful, and suggest
the need for federal regulation which emphasizes the establishment of
minimum standards and the provision of information. The more familiar
distributive justifications for regulation (which presume that workers al-
ways benefit from stringent rules) are, however, deeply flawed. They are
based on a distorted view of the way labor markets can be expected to
respond to health and safety regulations.
Assume first that workers have a right to a safe workplace, and then
consider the next step: Should workers be entitled to trade this safety right
for higher pay, or should this right be made inalienable? Inalienability is
supported by those who take an interest in workers' health but not in
their overall level of well-being, and by those who do not wish to ac-
knowledge that base wages are so low that people are willing to sacrifice
health for income. Imposing costs on workers because of the squeamish-
ness of others, however, hardly seems like good public policy, especially
for a program ostensibly designed to benefit workers. A better response
would be a program of redistributive taxation and subsidy that leads most
people to choose improvements in health over marginal improvements in
income."'
If, however, relative status matters to workers, and if status is measured
by one's position in the ranking of money incomes, then workers may
favor direct regulation. In the absence of regulation, workers are caught in
a "prisoners' dilemma" and may agree to higher pay in return for ac-
cepting greater risks. If everyone does this, no one ultimately benefits.
Relative positions remain unchanged. Given this possibility, most workers
might wish to bind themselves not to make such deals.62 While this argu-
ment for inalienability is provocative, it requires more empirical testing.
Do workers only care about relative money income? Might not workplace
60. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 12-13.
61. See also Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931 (1985) (proposing more general analysis of efficiency and equality justifications for inalien-
ability rules).
62. J. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT-r POND 136-41 (1985) (making this argument in context of
theory that stresses importance of relative status).
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conditions also affect relative status? Do highly paid construction workers
have higher status than more poorly paid white collar workers?
Second, however one resolves the inalienability issue, one must assess
the value of the right to a safe workplace, in the absence of a right to one's
job or to a particular wage. As it stands, if a person holds a job with a
particular employer, then he or she may not be subjected to certain
hazards. Wages, however, can be adjusted to take account of these
hazards, and the size of the workforce can be reduced."3 In a prosperous
industry, unionized workers may obtain real short-term gains if firms
spend more on health and safety and cannot adjust wages under the con-
tract.64 Over the long term, however, government regulation of workplace
health and safety is unlikely to cause much redistribution. In order for
workers to obtain all the benefits, regulation must impose a fixed cost on
the firm that is not large enough to cause it to shut down. This will occur,
however, only if the firm was earning monopoly profits before regulation
was imposed and if marginal costs are unaffected. In more general cases
regulation is likely to reduce employment levels and the real value of take-
home pay, and to raise product prices even if workers who retain their
jobs are better off. Regulation may still be desirable because workers ben-
efit from better health and fewer accidents, but it should not be lightly
presumed that the costs of regulation will be primarily borne by owners of
capital and consumers.
Even workers facing employers with monopsony power may not be bet-
ter off under stringent occupational health and safety rules. Such employ-
ers can make take-it-or-leave-it offers which include unhealthy and unsafe
working conditions. This tactic, however, depends on poorly informed
workers since well-informed workers who saw a hazard they wanted cor-
rected would accept a pay cut in return for the increase in safety. The
monopsony power of the employer should be irrelevant. Thus one would
not expect health and safety regulation, by itself, to help workers in weak
bargaining positions. It might even hurt them by reducing their options.
The basic problem for these workers is their weak bargaining position,
not the fact that they are willing to accept risks in return for higher pay.
3. Policy Proposals
The policy suggested by this analysis occupies a middle ground between
the Chicagoans' faith in free markets and the present regulatory system
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. First, employers should be
required to inform workers and job applicants of the hazards they face in
the workplace. This information should be provided both in a clear and
nontechnical form for workers and in the technical form necessary for in-
63. W. VIscUsi. supra note 55, at 83.
64. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 32-33.
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dependent research. 5 Second, the government should sponsor research
designed to discover the level of risk posed by various substances, tools,
capital equipment, and generic work practices. It should also sponsor re-
search on the treatment of work-related health problems. 6 Third, a subset
of hazards should be restricted by regulation to avoid serious risks that
most people would not plausibly pay to accept. While a full-fledged cost-
benefit test may be impossible to apply given the difficulty of assigning
monetary values to health risks, regulatory restrictions should, at least,
equalize the marginal cost of safety across occupations, and they should be
set at levels that are clearly cost effective. 7 The standards should be ex-
pressed in terms of health benefits to be achieved, not particular tech-
niques or ambient levels of toxics.68 Such standards would permit employ-
ers and workers to settle on cost-effective techniques. Fourth, the agency
should set a second tier of more stringent benchmark standards for some
health and safety hazards. These would have a different legal status than
the mandated minimal standards. The minimal standards should be firm,
well-enforced requirements. In contrast, the secondary standards should
be designed to give workers leverage when bargaining with employers ei-
ther individually or through their unions. Employers should be required
to comply with these secondary standards unless the workers agree to per-
mit their relaxation in return for other job-related benefits.69 Workers
who asserted their rights under the act could not be fired or disciplined.
Employers would have to compensate them to accept hazards. Fifth, new
chemical substances would be pre-screened to eliminate or control severe
hazards. The pre-screening procedures would be expedited with the bur-
den on the government to show a major risk of harm to workers. Care
would be taken to be sure that new substances are not disadvantaged rela-
tive to existing substances.70 Finally, the worker compensation system
65. Lyndon, supra note 59.
66. W. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 84-87, 157-59.
67. For standard discussions of cost-benefit techniques, see E. GRAMLICH, BENEFrI-COST ANAL-
YSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (1981); E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 11; D. WEI-
MER & A. VINING, supra note 11. For a critical view, see Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YAL LJ. 1315 (1974).
68. For an example of the controversy over the use of command and control regulation, see Latin,
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 'Fine-Tuning'
Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985) and the critical comment on this article by
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). For a general
defense of the use of incentive systems in public policy, see C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF THE
PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
69. There is some evidence that the existing Act, although it lacks the two-tier structure proposed
here, operates de facto as a bargaining chip for unions. See J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY,
supra note 55, at 16-17, 91. Mendeloffs evidence for this claim is, however, mainly indirect and
circumstantial.
70. For a discussion of how the inconsistent treatment of new-versus-old technology biases invest-
ment decisions under other regulatory programs, see Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regula-
tion, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983).
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should be reformed to make it operate as an insurance system that gives
more incentives to employers to reduce accidents.1
B. Present Federal Policy
The conclusions suggested by reformist policy analysis diverge signifi-
cantly from the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("the Act")." The points of difference occur in the language of the stat-
ute, in the way the Agency has formulated priorities and set standards,
and in the courts' interpretation of the statutory language.
1. The Act
The Act is quite specific about procedures and quite vague about pol-
icy: Congress has given almost no guidance on the substance of health and
safety regulation. The Act's purpose is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources."" One way in which this is to
be done is "by providing medical criteria which will assure insofar as
practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional ca-
pacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work experience. '7 4 Occupa-
tional health and safety standards must be "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment. ' " However, Congress has not articulated a view of how the
labor market works when threats to health and safety exist nor clarified
how tradeoffs between the interests of workers, employers, and customers
should be made.
Beyond the vague, hortatory statutory language, the only explicit men-
tion of standard-setting criteria is the insistence that, within two years, the
Secretary of Labor shall "by rule promulgate. . . any national consensus
standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he determines that
the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety
or health for specifically designated employees." 7  These standards are
71. See W. Viscus, supra note 55, at 87-92, 159-60 (discussing workers' compensation reform).
This approach is in contrast to the injury tax considered by the Council of Economic Advisors and
other economists when the Occupational Safety and Health Act was debated. See J. MENDELOFF,
REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 25-31. Improvements in workers' compensation appear su-
perior to an injury tax since the employers' payments would go to the workers. My general perspec-
tive assumes that the Occupational Health and Safety Administration should concentrate on hazards
that can be regulated generically by bringing to bear general knowledge about occupational hazards.
Health and safety problems that are idiosyncratic to particular workplaces and particular employees
can be best handled by negotiations between workers and employers. By requiring employers to pay
for harms through workers' compensation, these negotiations could be weighted in favor of workers.
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
73. Id. § 651(b).
74. Id. § 651(b)(7).
75. Id. § 652(8).
76. Id. § 655(a).
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only a first step. The Secretary can modify them in accord with proce-
dures set out in the Act" but is given no general guidance about how to
set standards beyond that provided in the definitional section.78 A special
paragraph dealing with "toxic materials or harmful physical agents" is a
model of ambiguity in which qualifying phrases follow other qualifying
phrases."9
But the Act is not entirely without meaning. While it does not follow
the suggested policy outlined above, it does incorporate some of the ideas
presented in the policy discussion. In particular, it requires disclosure of
workplace hazards,8" requires standards for all serious hazards,81 permits
performance standards,82 and provides for research on hazards and for the
collection of statistics.8 It does not, however, have any provision for two
tiers of standards, does not give guidance on setting priorities, and does
not establish a pre-screening requirement."M Therefore, if one accepts the
analysis of the issue presented above, the Act's provisions are both too lax
and too stringent.
2. The Agency
Given the Act's broad delegation, much depends on the central poli-
cymaking agency-the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
77. Id. § 655(b).
78. Id. § 652(8) states that "'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which
requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment."
79. Id. § 665(b)(5). The ambiguity of the language is indicated by the lawsuits brought under
that section. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); ASARCO, Inc. v.
OSHA, 746 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984) and cases cited therein.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1982) requires employers to provide certain information to employees;
however, § 664 exempts trade secrets. Under § 655(b)(7), regulations must include warning provi-
sions. The Secretary of Health and Human Services must publish lists of hazards (§ 669(6)), and
annual reports must be prepared by both the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. Id. § 675. The rule dealing with access to employee exposure and medical records is
at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1987). The hazard communication (labeling) rule is at 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200 (1987). Employers must identify chemicals and issue warnings but need not perform new
tests. See Sussman, An Overview of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard and Key Issues of
Interpretation, 42 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 307 (1987); Lyndon, supra note 59.
The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), also requires hazard disclo-
sure. However, it has not accumulated much useful data, has required little testing, and has kept
secret much data it does have. See Lyndon, supra note 59. The National Research Council, in Tox-
Icrry TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEaDs AND PRIORITIES (1984), reports on the need for
chemical exposure and health effects information. It concludes that, for most chemicals, information is
inadequate. Id. at 125-26.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (Supp. IV 1986).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1982).
83. Id. §§ 669, 671, 673.
84. The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2604 (1982), does contain pre-screen-
ing requirements that apply to workplace hazards. However, reporting requirements are weak and
testing can only be ordered by the Environmental Protection Agency if an unreasonable risk exists.
Haslow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J.
553, 567 (1986); Lyndon, supra note 59.
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("OSHA"). 5 While certain activities, such as pre-screening, are clearly
beyond the statutory mandate, OSHA has considerable discretion both in
setting priorities and determining standards. In general, OSHA has failed
to use its policymaking freedom intelligently. In a recent pair of cogently
argued books, John Mendeloff develops this thesis in detail.8"
Consider safety regulation first. While Mendeloff's empirical work in-
dicates that safety regulation has had some impact on relevant accident
rates,17 the overall impact on accidents has been small, and the wholesale
adoption of national "consensus" standards has led to accusations that
OSHA has concentrated on trivial infractions. There is some evidence,
though, that OSHA safety standards have improved the bargaining power
of workers by permitting them to file complaints with the agency. Given
infrequent OSHA inspections, workers can use the threat of a complaint
as a bargaining chip." OSHA standards, therefore, may act somewhat
like the second tier of standards proposed in the policy discussion. If, how-
ever, enhancement of workers' bargaining power is really the main benefit
of OSHA, it should be explicitly acknowledged in the language of the
statute, not permitted to occur by default. Specific policies might then be
designed to further this goal.
In the regulation of toxic substances, Mendeloff argues that OSHA reg-
ulates too few hazards but overregulates the few it focuses upon.' By
setting very stringent rules for some substances, OSHA practically guar-
antees court challenges that will drag on for years.9" OSHA should
85. A fuller analysis would consider the role of subsidiary agencies and institutions created by the
statute. The Act divides authority and creates a complex administrative structure. While primary
authority is given to the Secretary of Labor, the Act creates a gaggle of quasi-independent bodies. For
example, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health is established in the Department
of Health and Human Services to do research and recommend standards to the Department of Labor.
29 U.S.C. § 671 (1982). A National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health is to
advise the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary may convene other, broadly representative, commit-
tees to advise on specific hazards. Id. § 670(c). Finally, an Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, which closely resembles an independent agency, is to hear appeals from citations issued
by the Secretary and to issue orders to employers. Id. §§ 659, 661.
86. See J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA, supra note 55; J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY,
supra note 55. Other analyses of OSHA's behavior are found in T. GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND
DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1984); D. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE POLITICS OF
HEALTH REGULATION (1982); B. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY (1984); W. Viscusi,
supra note 55.
87. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 94-120. This conclusion is contro-
versial. See the contrary results in R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS
GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1976); Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regula-
tions, 10 BELL J. ECON. 117 (1979). A more recent study, however, also found that OSHA has had
an impact on workplace safety. Cooke & Gautschi, OSHA, Plant Safety Programs and Injury Re-
duction, 20 INDUS. REL. 245 (1981).
88. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY, supra note 55, at 91.
89. J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA, Supra note 55.
90. For example, the original benzene standard was issued on February 10, 1978. 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1028 (1979). The Supreme Court disallowed the rule on July 2, 1980. Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The cotton dust standard was issued in
1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,352 (1978), and upheld by the Supreme Court in 1981. American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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quickly put into effect, and then stringently enforce, baseline regulations
for a wide range of hazards that represent well-thought-out revisions of
existing consensus standards.9 Once this first step is taken, OSHA can
consider raising the standards for selected hazards. In the meantime, how-
ever, the baseline would be in place and would remain so should more
stringent standards be challenged in court.
The difficulty that Mendeloff has isolated in toxic substance regulation
derives from the method OSHA has used to set individual standards.
There are two aspects to this problem: First, the stringency of the stan-
dards; and second, the form of the regulations. Public policy techniques
suggest that cost-benefit criteria should be used to determine the level of
care required for employees. OSHA does not have a strong record in this
regard. In its early years, the agency had little policy expertise and did
not effectively use available information.92 Over time, however, executive
orders requiring cost-benefit analysis have induced OSHA to expand its
policy staff.9 3 The agency has begun to perform the required studies in
spite of the obvious difficulty of measuring the value of health benefits
and reductions in the risk of death.9 Unfortunately, OSHA's capacities
have improved in a political climate hostile to regulation, so few major
rulemakings have been undertaken. Overall, rulemaking priorities seem
guided more by political than by cost-effectiveness criteria.95
Even when OSHA has engaged in policy analyses, it has typically
framed its regulations in primitive command-and-control language." In
drafting regulations, OSHA has either required particular control tech-
91. In June OSHA began a rulemaking proceeding designed to provide a wholesale revision of
the standards for hundreds of chemicals. The proposal has been criticized for relying too heavily on
standards developed by the private American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists and
for lacking enforcement strength. Nevertheless, it appears to be a constructive step. 53 Fed. Reg.
20,960 (1988); 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1334 (Jan. 27, 1988); id. at 1376 (Feb. 3, 1988); id. at 1618
(Apr. 6, 1988); id. at 1821 (May 11, 1988); 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 19 (June 8, 1988); id. at 91
(June 15, 1988); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNNEN. APRIL 1, 1988-MARCH 31, 1989, AT 297-98 (1988) [hereinafter OMB
STUDY 1988].
92. For a criticism of OSHA's rulemaking practices, see Nichols & Zeckhauser, OSHA After a
Decade: A Time for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 202 (L.
Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1981).
93. The most recent versions are Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34 (1982), and Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5
U.S.C.A. § 601 app. at 296-97 (1988). For an overview of pre-Reagan efforts to provide executive
oversight, see W. VIscusi. supra note 55, at 150-55.
94. See, e.g., OSHA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Revise Concrete & Masonry Construction
Safety Standards, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,543 (1985); OSHA Final Rule on Occupational Exposure to For-
maldehyde, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1926 (1987).
95. This is, of course, a controversial position. For the outlines of the debate, see DeMuth &
Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986); Morrison,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1059 (1986). Additional thoughts on the debate can be found in THE REAGAN REGULATORY
STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT (G. Eads & M. Fix eds. 1984).
96. For a sample of the debate over the use of command and control regulation, see the sources
cited at supra note 68.
1988]
HeinOnline -- 98 Yale L. J. 363 1988-1989
The Yale Law Journal
niques or, at best, has focused on ambient air quality rather than workers'
exposure levels.97 Engineering controls are favored over personal protec-
tive devices.9" More outcome-oriented approaches do seem to be possible
under the statute, and have recently been proposed by OSHA for some
hazards." These recent innovations should be expanded.
3. The Courts
a. Feasibility and Policy Analysis
Could this distinctly mediocre performance by Congress and the Agency
be improved by artful judicial intervention? Maybe so, but the Supreme
Court has not tried to find out. Instead, the Court has rejected the use of
cost-benefit techniques by OSHA in regulating toxic substances and has
uncritically adopted the questionable distributive rhetoric of some of
OSHA's supporters. In its benzene and cotton dust decisions,'" the Su-
preme Court imposed more irrationality on OSHA than was strictly re-
quired by the statute. The Justices provided a highly formal and artificial
interpretation of the statutory language, even quoting the dictionary at
one point to bolster their argument.101 In setting forth their interpretation
of the statute in the benzene case, they rejected the more systematic, pol-
icy-oriented view of the lower court. 0 2
Consider how OSHA must set standards for toxic substances under the
Court's rulings.103 First, it must determine which hazards create a sub-
stantial risk to health. In making this determination, the Agency may use
cost-benefit criteria, but once the hazard has been placed on the agenda,
using a cost-benefit test to set the level of the standard is taboo. Second,
OSHA must calculate the costs of progressively more stringent standards,
and must choose the one that is as stringent as possible subject to the
97. See J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA, supra note 55, at 22 (summary of ambient standards). If
the ultimate aim is to improve workers' health, worker exposure is a more valid measure of the level
of control than ambient air quality.
98. J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA, supra note 55, at 177-80. Personal protective devices are
often much cheaper than engineering controls but are frequently opposed by workers. Workers could,
however, be compensated for accepting respirators or earplugs in those situations in which such de-
vices are cost effective.
99. The hazards include: cotton dust, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1987); grain elevators, 17 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) 1227 (Jan. 6, 1988); asbestos, 15 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 917 (Jan. 30, 1986); ethylene oxide, 53
Fed. Reg. 11,414 (1988). See also OSHA's proposed revision of the air contaminant exposure limits.
Id. at 20,960 (1988).
In an interesting switch, firms in the smelting industry argued that OSHA's rule on airborne arse-
nic should be overturned because OSHA had not told them specifically what technology to employ.
They argued that it was "unreasonable" for them to have to develop their own compliance plans. The
court of appeals rejected this argument. ASARCO, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483, 498 (9th Cir. 1984).
100. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton dust); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (benzene).
101. American Textile, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09.
102. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
103. The process is described in Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. 607, 640-46 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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constraint that the industry remain "viable." An OSHA standard may
thus be set at a point where the marginal gain in health is small and the
marginal cost is very large. The emphasis on industry viability means that
very dangerous occupations in marginally profitable industries may be un-
regulated while other jobs may be made so safe at such a high cost that
employment levels and money wages will shrink. Thus "feasibility" anal-
ysis, as envisaged by the Court, can exacerbate OSHA's tendency to both
overregulate and underregulate. Such a standard-setting technique ignores
the wisdom of focusing on marginal costs and benefits at all stages of the
analysis.
Small wonder then that the deregulation-prone Reagan administration
has avoided rulemaking in the toxic substance area.1' Once the rulemak-
ing process is begun, the reasoning in the cotton dust case must be ap-
plied. Therefore, OSHA appears to have avoided putting items on the
agenda-a decision that is not subject to judicial review.
Workplace health regulation would be stronger and more effective if
the Supreme Court majority had adopted an interpretation of the statute
consistent with the principles of policy analysis. An opening was provided
by the lower court opinion in the benzene case: The Fifth Circuit applied
a cost-benefit test by developing an analogy to the regulation of consumer
product safety and the Learned Hand test in tort law. 10 5 Only Justice
Powell was willing to follow the lower court's formulation. For Powell, a
104. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1987-MARcH 31, 1988, at 650 (1987) (only three substances, formaldehyde,
benzene and ethylene dibromide, listed as reaching final rule stage during that period); OFFCE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT:
APRIL 1, 1986-MARCH 31, 1987, at 579 (1986) (same three substances, plus asbestos, are listed in
final rule category). Only the asbestos regulations were actually issued in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,612
(1986), and they lacked any controls on short-term exposures, 53 Fed. Reg. 14,029 (1988). In 1987, a
benzene regulation was finally issued and has been accepted without court challenge. The benzene
rule is a response to Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Final OSHA Rule on Occupa-
tional Exposure to Benzene, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1987); see also 17 O.S.H. Rep. 995 (BNA) (Dec. 2,
1987) (steelworkers, AISI, withdraw challenges to benzene rule filed in D.C. Circuits). A rule for
formaldehyde was issued in February 1988, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1926 (1987), but ethylene dibromide
remains on OSHA's agenda. See OMB STUDY 1988, supra note 91, at 288-89. No other substances
are expected to reach the final rule stage during the current year. Id. at 584.
105. Given the similarity of the underlying issues, the Fifth Circuit concluded that:
OSHA's failure to provide an estimate of expected benefits for reducing the permissible expo-
sure limit, supported by substantial evidence, makes it impossible to assess the reasonableness
of the relationship between expected costs and benefits. This failure means that the required
support is lacking to show reasonable necessity for the standard promulgated.
American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 1978).
However, the Agency was not required to conduct "an elaborate cost-benefit analysis" so long as the
benefits bear "a reasonable relationship" to the costs. Id. at 503. Thus the burden of proof was placed
on the Agency, but the standard imposed took account of the imperfect information available.
In several cases decided before the benzene case, lower courts had found that the Consumer Product
Safety Commission was required to balance benefits against costs when regulating hazardous prod-
ucts. The lower courts observed that the issue of workplace health and safety looks very similar to the
issue of product safety. Part of the justification for this interpretation comes from the common law of
torts. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1978); Forester v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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finding that the costs were commensurate with the benefits would have
been sufficient to demonstrate that a significant risk existed-"" Thus he
implicitly recognized that a regulation that saved very few lives but did so
very cheaply would be worth pursuing. He also would have permitted
OSHA to issue regulations even though the underlying data were weak,
so long as OSHA made good use of what was available.107 However, he
concluded, with the Fifth Circuit, that "the statute also requires the
agency to determine that the economic effects of its standard bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the expected benefits. ' 0 8
Why did no other Justices join in Powell's concurrence? The answer
lies deeper than the Court's formalistic approach to statutory construction.
Instead, some of the Justices adopted the flawed distributive arguments
that have been central to the political debate over OSHA.1 ° Lacking the
tools of economic theory, they took congressional pronouncements at face
value. Higher standards were simply assumed to benefit workers. But as
we have seen, it is not obvious that worker welfare will be improved by
moving beyond the level of protection suggested by cost-benefit analysis. A
court that recognized this possibility could have provided a more reasoned
critique of the agency's actions.1 10
b. The Nondelegation Doctrine: Toward Legislative Consistency
We can now step back and consider the relevance of this case to the
framework approach sketched earlier. As noted previously, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act has a vague and general statement of pur-
pose. 1 Concurring in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., Justice Rehnquist's suggested remedy for such statutory
ambiguities was a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. Holding the Act
unconstitutional would, he believed, force Congress "to reshoulder the
burden of ensuring that Congress itself make[s] the critical policy deci-
sions." 2 Rehnquist's approach thus recognizes congressional incentives to
write vague statutes, but his solution is oversimplified and heavy-handed.
106. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 666 (1980).
107. Id. at 666-67.
108. Id. at 667, 670.
109. In American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 514-22, Justice Brennan quotes
extensively from the rhetoric in the Congressional Record to support his position that workers benefit
from stringent rules. See also Industrial Union Dep't, 448 F.2d 607, 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing legislative history to buttress similar interpretation).
110. In areas other than toxic substances, there is some evidence that this type of review may be
possible under OSHA. Safety issues can still be decided on cost-benefit grounds. Courts have also
appeared more hospitable to public policy arguments when the issue is method of compliance rather
than the level of worker health and safety. See Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d 641 (9th
Cir. 1982) (hearing damage in cannery); 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 7 (June 1, 1988) (National Grain
and Food Association file brief in lawsuit challenging grain elevator standard).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
112. Rehnquist goes on to say: "It is difficult to imagine a more obvious example of Congress
simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental for the purposes of the statute and yet politi-
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While the Act is defective, Rehnquist's solution is draconian. Many
regulatory issues, including occupational health and safety, are technically
complex and involve difficult valuation problems. In the case of OSHA,
the arguments for delegation involve both scientific complexity and the
inherently difficult issue of valuing injuries, illness, and death. In contrast
to Rehnquist's effort to revive the nondelegation doctrine, the basic goal of
the framework statute is to use courts to improve the legislative branch's
accountability to citizens. The statute is designed to achieve this goal
neither by flat invalidation nor by judicial scrutiny of substance, but by
scrutiny of the clarity and logical consistency of legislative means-end lan-
guage. This exercise in judicial oversight does not ask courts to engage in
policy analysis, but it does require them to understand and evaluate such
arguments. Judges should ask a series of questions of the legislative prod-
uct: Does the act dearly state its purposes, and are the statutory details
consistent with these purposes? Are the costs of a policy recognized, and is
the executive branch given guidance about how to make the major policy
tradeoffs? Are subsequent appropriations sufficient to carry out the statu-
tory mandate?
This perspective permits delegation when technical expertise or detailed
case-by-case judgments are necessary, while at the same time insisting that
Congress make critical policy choices concerning how much of society's
resources (public and private) should be used to further a program's basic
goals.11  Mandating internal consistency and budgetary consistency re-
quires a genuinely progressive effort by Congress: A flawed statute might
be judged both impermissibly vague, because basic policy goals are not
stated concretely, and overly specific, because the agency faces constraints
which restrict effective performance.11' The implications of this analysis
for OSHA must await the more careful articulation of these principles by
judges and legal scholars. At a minimum, however, responsible policy
analysts should propose legislative alternatives to Congress that focus on
the costs and distributive consequences of health and safety regulation as
well as on the benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
Law and economics should be at the center of study of the modern
welfare state. Today, it is at the periphery. By focusing on the common
cally so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer
out in the legislative forge . . . ." 448 U.S. 607, 687. See also American Textile, 452 U.S. 490, 543
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Compare Rehnquist's position with Ely's similar argument, supra note
48, at 131-34.
113. See, e.g., B. AcKERMAN & W. HAssER, supra note 29 (arguing for adoption of this strat-
egy in environmental area).
114. For example, an act might state that its purpose was the highest possible level of safety and
then include clauses mandating particular engineering controls that represent a high-cost method of
imposing safety.
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law and by taking a generally negative view of the operation of the public
sector, lawyer-economists have ceded analysis of the political-economic
system to others. This Comment demonstrates that a more constructive
approach is possible and even necessary. While a number of the most
innovative administrative law scholars have made a beginning, a much
more substantial reform of the field is required. Economists, policy ana-
lysts, and political scientists should actively collaborate with public law-
yers on pedagogical and scholarly projects. Integration should occur both
at the level of high theory, where the underlying structures of the state are
at issue, and at the level of concrete policy, where detailed, fact-bound
analyses are essential.
Scholarly reorientation, moreover, should be only part of a larger pro-
cess of administrative law reform. To provoke the kind of discussion that
is required, I have argued for a new framework statute for the adminis-
trative state that concentrates on the accountability of Congress rather
than on the behavior of agencies. Courts and the legal profession have
been too ready to view the legislature as an unexamined black box whose
work is presumptively valid if no explicit constitutional guarantees are
violated. In contrast, modem work on public choice and public policy
points to a new kind of judicial review, one that focuses on the weaknesses
of representative lawmaking without asking judges to impose their own
substantive policy views on the nation. The challenge is to take seriously
the possibility of procedural reforms that can improve democratic
accountability.
But it makes little sense to argue about such fundamental reforms in
the abstract. I have tried to suggest the benefits of the framework ap-
proach by a study of occupational health and safety policy. This brief
sketch sought to accomplish two tasks. First, it tried to demonstrate how a
grasp of economic reasoning can help clarify vexing issues in health and
safety law. Second, it showed how the judicial failure to examine the
means-end connection in regulatory statutes can reinforce congressional
incentives to hide behind vague, but politically pleasing, rhetoric.
In this Comment I have provided only an overview of a proposed gen-
eral framework statute and of occupational safety and health policy. I aim
by these examples to chart the direction that research should take. If
broad-based fundamental inquires can intersect with studies of particular
problems, each will be enriched by the insights of the other. The result
will be an administrative law that is stronger, both theoretically and em-
pirically, than the present court-centered paradigm.
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